xt0n1-t3ch/Codex-Discord-Rich-Presence

Rust·121 files·commit 0caece6·scanned 17m ago·cached ✓

70/100

DANGEROUS

Sensitive capability combinations reachable from entry points. Do not run without review.

This repository contains patterns associated with malware. Do NOT run this code.

verdict accurate?

Crypto/Web3 project

28% file coverage

threat-state: dangerouslive

FINDINGS ░▒▓

criticalRust process Command usagestd::process::Command can execute arbitrary shell commands. Malware uses it to drop payloads, exfiltrate data, or establish persistence.src/app.rs


    let status = Command::new("osascript")
        .arg("-e")
        .arg(format!(

criticalRust process Command usagestd::process::Command can execute arbitrary shell commands. Malware uses it to drop payloads, exfiltrate data, or establish persistence.src/config.rs

        let source = include_str!("config.rs");
        let direct_spawn = ["Command::new(", "\"wsl.exe\"", ")"].concat();
        let hidden_spawn = ["crate::util::silent_command(", "\"wsl.exe\"", ")...

warningRust unsafe blockunsafe blocks bypass Rust's memory safety guarantees. Malware uses them for raw pointer manipulation, shellcode injection, or calling dangerous foreign functions.src/power.rs

    pub fn enable() -> io::Result<()> {
        let process = unsafe { GetCurrentProcess() };
        let size = std::mem::size_of::<PowerState>() as u32;
        let mut previous = PowerState {

warningRust unsafe blockunsafe blocks bypass Rust's memory safety guarantees. Malware uses them for raw pointer manipulation, shellcode injection, or calling dangerous foreign functions.src/process_guard.rs

        let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("temp dir");
        unsafe {
            env::set_var("CODEX_HOME", tmp.path());
        }

criticalRust process Command usagestd::process::Command can execute arbitrary shell commands. Malware uses it to drop payloads, exfiltrate data, or establish persistence.src/process_guard.rs

        let signal = if force { "-KILL" } else { "-TERM" };
        let status = Command::new("kill")
            .arg(signal)
            .arg(pid.to_string())

infoSuspicious files are not reachable from entry pointsFlagged files exist but are not imported by any entry point. They may be dead code, tests, or attack payloads triggered by another mechanism.+2

warningRust wallet/crypto code with network activityCode handling private keys or signing and also making network requests may be exfiltrating secrets or sending funds to an attacker.src/discord.rs


use crate::config::{DesktopPresenceDesign, PresenceConfig, PresenceSurface};
use crate::cost::{PricingStatus, format_presentable_cost};
use crate::model::format_model_display;

infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (approve-release.ps1) in repositoryscripts/approve-release.ps1+2

infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (build-release.ps1) in repositoryscripts/build-release.ps1+2

infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (check-release-contract.ps1) in repositoryscripts/check-release-contract.ps1+2

infoAuthor has no other public repositoriesGitHub user "dependabot[bot]" has no other public repositories, common for burner accounts used in scams.+2

Scores are heuristics. A “safe” verdict means no known-malicious patterns were found — clever malware can look boring. Wrong verdict? Flag it above; confirmed false positives become regression tests.

34 files scanned @ 0caece6 | 9/25/2026 | heuristic scan — always review manually

risk by category

code execution25

network & exfiltration5

file system access0

obfuscation0

supply chain15

owasp / injection0

telemetry

files 34/121rules hit 11engine v6commit 0caece6

github

xt0n1-t3ch/Codex-Discord-Rich-Presence

Discord Rich Presence for Codex CLI, Codex VS Code Extension, and Codex App.

Rust

214d

121 files

34 scanned(28%)

0caece6

architecture░▒▓

entry (2) flagged (6) pkg (38)

68 nodes · 77 edgesscroll to zoom · click node to jump to finding