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DANGER
malware detected
github.com / leeguooooo

leeguooooo/chatgpt-use

Rust·46 files·commit d903794·scanned 16m ago·cached ✓
85/100
MALICIOUS
Matches known-malicious patterns. Do not clone or install.

This repository contains patterns associated with malware. Do NOT run this code.

verdict accurate?
Crypto/Web3 project
Research / educational context
threat-state: maliciouslive

FINDINGS ░▒▓

criticaleval() usage detectedeval() executes arbitrary code and is commonly used in malware to run obfuscated payloads fetched from remote servers.src/channel.rs
    /// decoded value. Exposed for side flows like `refresh`.
    pub fn eval(&self, js: &str) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
        let t = (self.timeout_secs.min(30) as f64).max(5.0);
        ab_ev...
+8
warningRust unsafe blockunsafe blocks bypass Rust's memory safety guarantees. Malware uses them for raw pointer manipulation, shellcode injection, or calling dangerous foreign functions.src/channel.rs
        // SAFETY: the whole test body runs with HOME redirected and restores it.
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("HOME", &tmp) };

        assert_eq!(cached_gizmo("proj"), None);
+3
criticalRust process Command usagestd::process::Command can execute arbitrary shell commands. Malware uses it to drop payloads, exfiltrate data, or establish persistence.src/channel.rs
) -> Result<String> {
    let mut cmd = Command::new(ab);
    if let Some(prof) = profile {
        cmd.args(["--profile", prof]);
+8
criticalRust process Command usagestd::process::Command can execute arbitrary shell commands. Malware uses it to drop payloads, exfiltrate data, or establish persistence.src/channel/lock_tests.rs

    let mut command = Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap());
    command
        .args([
+8
criticalRust process Command usagestd::process::Command can execute arbitrary shell commands. Malware uses it to drop payloads, exfiltrate data, or establish persistence.src/cmd/cancel.rs
fn kill_owner(pid: u32) -> Option<Value> {
    let killed = std::process::Command::new("taskkill.exe")
        .args(["/PID", &pid.to_string(), "/T", "/F"])
        .status()
+8
criticalRemote script piped into a shellA shell script downloads remote content and executes it directly (e.g. `curl … | bash`). The payload is never stored or reviewable and can change server-side — a classic malware/backdoor install pattern.install.sh
# No npm, no token. Usage:
#   curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/leeguooooo/chatgpt-use/main/install.sh | sh
set -eu
+10
infoSuspicious files are not reachable from entry pointsFlagged files exist but are not imported by any entry point. They may be dead code, tests, or attack payloads triggered by another mechanism.+2
infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (install.ps1) in repositoryinstall.ps1+2

Scores are heuristics. A “safe” verdict means no known-malicious patterns were found — clever malware can look boring. Wrong verdict? Flag it above; confirmed false positives become regression tests.

25 files scanned @ d903794 | 9/25/2026 | heuristic scan — always review manually

risk by category
code execution25
network & exfiltration0
file system access0
obfuscation0
supply chain2
owasp / injection0
telemetry
files 25/46rules hit 8engine v6commit d903794

github

leeguooooo/chatgpt-use

Turn your ChatGPT web subscription into a coding-agent backend — no API key, no Codex billing. Built on chrome-use.

Rust
33
6
100d
46 files
25 scanned(54%)
d903794

architecture░▒▓

entry (1) flagged (6) pkg (15)
39 nodes · 37 edgesscroll to zoom · click node to jump to finding
⚠️ MALICIOUS (85/100) — leeguooooo/chatgpt-use — ScanRepo