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github.com / HKUDS

HKUDS/CLI-Anything

Python·1872 files·commit 810c18b·scanned 6d ago·cached ✓
15/100
LOW RISK
Minor findings consistent with the project type. Nothing reachable from install hooks.

score capped at 1548,597+ stars — findings likely false positives

verdict accurate?
48,597 stars
Partial architecture graph
CLI tool detected
threat-state: lowlive

FINDINGS ░▒▓

criticalPython dynamic code executioneval(), exec() or compile() on untrusted input can execute arbitrary code. Common in Python malware for running obfuscated payloads..github/scripts/validate_root_skills.py
    sync_script = REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "scripts" / "sync_root_skills.py"
    exec(sync_script.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), namespace)
    return namespace
+7
warningPython subprocess / os.system usageos.system() or subprocess with shell=True / suspicious commands can execute arbitrary shell commands. Plain pip/package installs are usually benign.firefly-iii/agent-harness/cli_anything/firefly_iii/utils/repl_skin.py
            import os
            os.system('')
        return f"{self.COLORS.get(color, '')}{text}{self.COLORS['reset']}"
+4
criticalPython dynamic code executioneval(), exec() or compile() on untrusted input can execute arbitrary code. Common in Python malware for running obfuscated payloads.blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/tests/test_bpy_gen.py

        # compile() will raise SyntaxError if the script is invalid
        try:
            compile(script, "<test>", "exec")
+7
criticalPython dynamic code executioneval(), exec() or compile() on untrusted input can execute arbitrary code. Common in Python malware for running obfuscated payloads.blender/agent-harness/cli_anything/blender/tests/test_full_e2e.py
        # Verify it parses as Python
        compile(script, "<bpy_script>", "exec")

    def test_complex_script_is_valid_python(self):
+7
warningPython subprocess / os.system usageos.system() or subprocess with shell=True / suspicious commands can execute arbitrary shell commands. Plain pip/package installs are usually benign.cli-hub/cli_hub/installer.py
    try:
        return subprocess.run(
            cmd if use_shell else shlex.split(cmd),
            capture_output=True,
+4
warningPython subprocess / os.system usageos.system() or subprocess with shell=True / suspicious commands can execute arbitrary shell commands. Plain pip/package installs are usually benign.cli-hub/cli_hub/matrix_skill.py
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
+4
infoSuspicious files are not reachable from entry pointsFlagged files exist but are not imported by any entry point. They may be dead code, tests, or attack payloads triggered by another mechanism.+2
warningHigh-entropy string literalsFound 11 long strings with high Shannon entropy. This is common in obfuscated payloads that hide URLs, keys, or bytecode..pi-extension/cli-anything/index.ts+3
warningHigh-entropy string literalsFound 8 long strings with high Shannon entropy. This is common in obfuscated payloads that hide URLs, keys, or bytecode..github/scripts/generate_meta_skill.py+3
warningFlattened or dead control flowDetected switch(true), dead if branches, or deeply nested ternaries — patterns used by obfuscators to hide execution order..github/scripts/update_registry_dates.py+3
warningHigh-entropy string literalsFound 4 long strings with high Shannon entropy. This is common in obfuscated payloads that hide URLs, keys, or bytecode..github/scripts/validate_root_skills.py+3
warningFlattened or dead control flowDetected switch(true), dead if branches, or deeply nested ternaries — patterns used by obfuscators to hide execution order.cli-hub-matrix/video-creation/scripts/video_doctor.py+3
warningFlattened or dead control flowDetected switch(true), dead if branches, or deeply nested ternaries — patterns used by obfuscators to hide execution order.zotero/agent-harness/cli_anything/zotero/utils/zotero_sqlite.py+3
infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (install.ps1) in repositorycodex-skill/scripts/install.ps1+2
infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (install.ps1) in repositorycursor-plugin/scripts/install.ps1+2
infoSuspicious file in repoExecutable file (lib.ps1) in repositorycursor-plugin/scripts/lib.ps1+2
warningHardcoded secret/credentialAPI keys, passwords, or tokens hardcoded in source code. Should be in environment variables.cli-hub/cli_hub/analytics.py
POSTHOG_API_HOST = "https://us.i.posthog.com"
POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN = "phc_ovP8d5bmjpn8YZnTo7pb6rE3TikcAMgmNVt75o3Ywejz"
HOSTNAME = "clianything.cc"
USER_AGENT = f"Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; cli-anythin...
+3

Scores are heuristics. A “safe” verdict means no known-malicious patterns were found — clever malware can look boring. Wrong verdict? Flag it above; confirmed false positives become regression tests.

1211 files scanned @ 810c18b | 8/29/2026 | heuristic scan — always review manually

risk by category
code execution25
network & exfiltration0
file system access0
obfuscation15
supply chain14
owasp / injection3
telemetry
files 1211/1872rules hit 17engine v5commit 810c18b

github

HKUDS/CLI-Anything

"CLI-Anything: Making ALL Software Agent-Native" -- CLI-Hub: https://clianything.cc/

Python
48597
4508
181d
1872 files
1211 scanned(65%)
810c18b

architecture░▒▓

entry (0) flagged (200) pkg (395)
795 nodes · 1985 edgesscroll to zoom · click node to jump to finding